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NOTE
State Department Determinations of Political
Offenses: Death Knell for the Political Offense
Exception in Extradition Law
by
Kenneth S. Sternberg*
and
David L. Skeldingt
U nited States extradition treaties have long contained clauses which
exempt from extradition those accused or convicted of political of-
fenses. Traditionally, the courts have determined the applicability of the
exemption in particular cases. A number of factors have complicated the
courts' task, however. International terrorism is very much in vogue. Indi-
viduals and political groups increasingly employ violence to meet their
political goals. As a result, the courts have had to determine the amount
of violence society will tolerate in order to effectuate the political crimes
exemption.
The judicial balancing of these competing concerns has induced criti-
cism of the court's ability to administer the exemption. A number of re-
cent decisions, in which political offenders were withheld from close U.S.
allies, has fueled criticism that the courts are unsuited to apply the politi-
cally oriented analysis that application of the exemption requires. A pro-
posal has emerged that would strip the courts of jurisdiction to adminis-
ter the exemption and vest jurisdiction exclusively in the Department of
State. This proposal has the support of both the Justice and the State
Departments, and has already become a part of three treaties to which
the United States is a party. While the Senate has recently rejected the
proposal, choosing to retain jurisdiction in the courts, the proposal re-
* Cornell University Law School, J.D. (1983); B.A. S.U.N.Y. at Stony Brook (1979).
t Cornell University Law School, J.D. (1983); BA. University of Chicago (1980).
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mains a subject of controversy and an issue having important effects on
the administration of the extradition laws.
This note will delineate the current status of the political offense ex-
ception by examining (1) its historical justifications, (2) its procedural
setting, (3) the legal definition of political offense and (4) the recent case
law. The note will then evaluate the efficacy and desirability of the pre-
sent and proposed methods of administering the political offense exemp-
tion and argue that the Senate was correct in abandoning its original pro-
posal to vest exclusive jurisdiction over the political offense exception in
the State Department.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Historical Justifications for the Political Offense Exception
Until the late 18th century, extradition was used primarily against
political and religious offenders.' At that time, political opponents and
religious heretics were viewed as a threat to all nations, 2 while common
criminals were not.' By the 19th century, the advances in transportation
accompanying the industrial revolution allowed common criminals to flee
to and threaten other jurisdictions. At the same time, the rise of political
liberalism fostered tolerance of political non-conformists. 5 Due to these
factors, extradition ceased to be a means of international political repres-
sion and became a method of international crime control. Accordingly,
the political offense exception was introduced, into the law of extradition.'
The historical justifications for the political offense exception fall
into three categories. First, the extradition of political offenders does not
serve the mutual interests of the interested states. Common criminals are
1 J. MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION 303-04 (1891).
I The dominant view of the political order attributed political authority to divine ordi-
nation. There was, therefore, a fundamental solidarity of interest among political elites; any
opposition against one state threatened all others. Research in International Law under the
Auspices of the Harvard Law School, I. Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 15, 108 (1935) [here-
inafter cited as Harvard Research]; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 635-636 (H. Lau-
terpacht, ed. 7th ed. Supp. 1948).
3 The physical difficulty of travel and the potent social stigma of exile from one's home
usually prevented common criminals from fleeing to other jurisdictions. I. SHEARER, EXTRA-
DITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-7 (1971).
4 Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 35-37 and 108-109. Common criminals, of course,
pose a threat to all societies. 1 L. OPPENHMM, supra note 2, at 636.
5 Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 108-109. Nations with constitutional liberties,
themselves products of revolutions, recognized a fundamental right to rebellion against op-
pression. Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition
and Asylum, 14 U. Prrr. L. REV. 371, 372 (1953).
6 Garcia-Mora, supra note 5, at 372; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 2, at 644.
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extradited because they are a threat to all nations7 and extradition thus
serves the interests of both the requesting and the requested state. In
contrast, the authentic political offender is a threat only to his own gov-
ernment, whose existence or form he opposes.8 Because the political of-
fender threatens only his home government, the requested state is seen to
have no interest in his extradition.9
Secondly, political offenders have enjoyed special status in demo-
cratic societies. The United States and most western European nations
owe their sovereignty and political liberty to popular revolution or consti-
tutional liberalism. As a result, the concept of the legitimate rebellion
against oppression is deeply rooted in western society.10 Nations claiming
adherence to such liberal principles are reluctant to be an accomplice in
the attempts of a foreign government to persecute its political oppo-
nents."' This reluctance is founded upon loyalty to democratic principles,
concern for human rights,1 2 and unwillingness to abet the punishment of
a revolutionary merely because he had the misfortune to fail."
Finally, the political offense exception is justified on humanitarian
and altruistic grounds. If a party in a civil war or revolution honestly
fights for his political beliefs and is defeated, it is likely that he will be
subjected to summary execution, to physical abuse or, at the very least, to
a politically tainted trial.14 A requested state might be unwilling to de-
liver the extraditee into such a position.
B. Methods Employed to Administer the Extradition Law
While most extradition treaties provide an exemption for political
crimes, few designate the organ of government which will decide whether
the exemption is applicable. In most countries, therefore, the extraditee is
free to argue that he is a political offender to either the executive or the
judiciary. The United States currently subscribes to this practice, al-
though, as mentioned, it has entered into three extradition treaties which
7 See supra note 2.
6 See supra note 3.
9 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 160 (1909) [Hereinaf-
ter cited as PROCEEDINGS]. This premise is related to the notion that in order to extradite an
individual, the offense charged must be an offense in the requested state. Hyde, Notes on
the Extradition Treaties of the United States, 8 AM. J. INT'L L. 487, 489 (1914).
10 Kutner, Due Process of Rebellion, 7 VAL. U.L. lRv. 1, 2-10 (1972).
11 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 9, at 146. Of course, adherence to liberal principles of polit-
ical tolerance often may be little more than a public posture, belied in practice through
varied forms of domestic political repression, e.g., the American loyalty oaths of the 1950's.
12 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 9, at 163.
18 Hyde, supra note 9, at 489.
14 See Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradi-
tion Law, 48 VA. L. Rlv. 1226 (1962).
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make the executive branch the exclusive forum to assert the exemption.
The countries which provide for exclusive executive jurisdiction over
the political crimes exemption do so only because they commit their en-
tire extradition procedure to the executive branch.15 While the prevailing
practice among nations is to involve the judiciary in the extradition pro-
cess, some states do not.16
1. Executive Method
As its name implies, the executive method runs exclusively within the
executive branch of the requested government. 7 The Foreign Minister re-
ceives the request, acting as an agent of the President or King, and for-
wards it to the Minister of Justice.18 The Minister of Justice's role is to
advise the President or King whether the request should be honored.19
The President or King has final authority and may completely disregard
the advice of the Minister of Justice.20
France had the most highly developed executive system of extradi-
tion21 until it disposed of it in 1927 in favor of a system in which a judi-
cial hearing was required. 2 The executive system is still in operation in
certain countries, such as Equador, Panama, Portugal and the Eastern
European countries.28
2. Judicial Method
The judicial method in its purest form provides for judicial participa-
tion in the extradition process.2 4 Among the states employing the judicial
method, the effect given judicial determination varies. In the Anglo-
American systems, judicial determinations are "conclusive as to the re-
fusal of extradition and advisory as to concession. 25 While judicial par-
ticipation is required in all events, the executive branch may disregard a
15 S. BEDI, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 136 (1966).
16 Id.
17 Id.
I Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 137.
22 Id.
13 Equador Extradition Law of Oct. 8, 1921, art. 51; Panama Extradition Law of Nov.
27, 1930, art. 9; Portugal's extradition law was spelled out in a Portugal-U.S. diplomatic
communication. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 183-4 n.57. The Eastern European
Countries have generally subscribed to the extradition law of Russia, Laws of Criminal Pro-
cedure of the Russian of 1914, art. 852.
24 Under this sytem no accused can be extradited without a judicial decision, although
in many cases this decision can be ignored. S. BEDI, supra note 15, at 137.
'5 I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 199.
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judicial grant of extradition but is bound to enforce a judicial denial of
extradition. This system allows the extraditee recourse before the judici-
ary, and, in the event of an adverse judicial determination, recourse
before the executive. The Anglo-American system prevails in, among
others, Great Britain and the United States.2"
In the Belgian system, judicial participation, while required, is purely
advisory.27 Under this system, the executive may make its decision in
complete disregard of the judicial determination after obtaining an advi-
sory opinion from the Court of Appeal.28 Systems calling for non-binding
judicial determinations are in operation in Mexico and Peru.29
On the other extreme is a system giving conclusive effect to judicial
determinations both for and against extradition."0 This system is said to
operate in Germany.31
C. U.S. Extradition Process
1. Procedural Aspects
The United States currently adheres to the judicial method in its
mixed form. 2 Present federal law requires the requesting state to channel
its request through two levels, the executive and the judiciary, and extra-
dition will not be granted without the approval of both branches.33 Ac-
cordingly, the authorized representative of the requesting state must:
(1) present a requisition to the Department of State in accordance with
treaty stipulation, and (2) file a verified complaint in the Federal District
Court wherein the (accused) is found charging him or her with an offense
under the terms of the treaty stipulations, the procedural laws of the
United States and the substantive laws of the state wherein the Federal
26 Great Britain: 33 and 34 Vict. c. 52. United States: Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. 3181
(1948).
" I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 198 n.6.
' The chambres des mises en accusation of the Court of Appeal renders the advisory
opinion. Id. at 199. As the opinion is not binding, no right of appeal lies against it. Id. at 199
n.l.
2, Mexico: Law of 3/17/77, arts. 19-22; Peru: Law of 10/23/88, art. 12.
30 L SHEARER, supra note 3, at 200.
" Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 186. However, this contention is disputed and it
is argued that Germany adheres to the Anglo-American system.
32 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fifth Amendment to re-
quire that the United States have a treaty with the requesting country before we can extra-
dite an accused to that country. Valentine v. United States ex rel Neideker, 299 U.S. 5
(1936) (by implication). International law, generally, does not recognize a right of the de-
manding state apart from treaty to demand extradition. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S.
276 (1933); 16 DEP'T ST. BULL. 212 (1947). However, some states have granted extradition in
the absence of treaty, as a matter of comity. See I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 27-34.
18 U.S.C. § 3184.
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District Court is located.3 4
The requisition to the Department of State is considered a formal
diplomatic request, 5 and a precondition to extradition."6 If the requisi-
tion has been filed before the commencement of judicial proceedings8 7
and has passed inspection by the Department of State,8 the Secretary of
State may institute a judicial hearing on the extradition request.3 9 How-
ever, this is not a requirement, and the requesting country may com-
mence judicial proceedings on its own.40
Once a complaint is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction,41 extra-
dition will be granted if the requesting state proves the following:
(1) that the extraditee is the person whom is sought, 2
34 M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADITION AND THE WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 511
(1974).
35 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 906 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 6 M.
WHITEMAN]. The requisition must conform to various substantive requirements specified in
the pertinent treaty. The consequences of a defective requisition are mitigated by the liberal
amendment policy followed by the Department of State. M. BAssIouNI, supra note 34, at
512. Most treaties contain deadlines after which no requisitions may be filed. Commonly,
extradition may not be granted after the expiration of a two-month period beginning when
the extraditee is arrested and confined pursuant to an extradition warrant.
30 Normally the requisition is made at the time documentary proofs are submitted in
support of extradition. 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 35, at 905 (1968). However, since under
federal law, the requesting state may itself institute extradition proceedings before a federal
magistrate, with the authorization of the State Department, the formal requisition can be
made after the documentary proofs are submitted but iin all events before the Secretary
makes his final decision on the request. The pertinent treaty may stipulate a deadline after
which the requisition will not be considered.
37 Id.
" M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 512.
39 The Department of Justice, acting on the State Department's behalf, is the com-
plainant in the "overwhelming majority of extradition cases." Memorandum, infra note 113
at § 9954. See contra 4 HACKWORTH DIGEST 93 (1944) and 6 M. WHITEMAN, supra note 35, at
916; Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902).
40 It is unnecessary that the complaint be fied by a consular or diplomatic officer. How-
ever, only authorized representatives of the requesting state may make requests under the
treaties. M. WHITEMAN, supra note 35, at 935. This requirement has generated judicial in-
quiry into the authority of the representative making the complaint. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Caputo v. Kelley, 92 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937), cert. denied 303 U.S. 635 (1938). The
Senate and House bills would permit only the Department of Justice to file complaints in
the federal courts. See S. 220, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3192, 129 CONG. REC. S 418 (1983), and
H.R. 3347, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 3192 (1983).
41 The court must have in personam jurisdiction over the accused in order to issue a
legally binding extradition order. M. BAssiouNI, supra note 34, at 514. While under present
law a state court has jurisdiction to hear extradition proceedings, Extradition Act 18 U.S.C.
§ 3184 (1976), the Senate Bill would limit these proceedings to the federal courts. See S.
220, supra note 40, at § 3192(a).
42 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 515 (1974).
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(2) that the offense charged is among the extraditable offenses listed in
the pertinent treaty,4
(3) that the offense charged is "a crime of a specified degree in both the
requested and requesting state,"" and
(4) that there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed
the crime charged.45
The bulk of the typical extradition hearing is focused on determining the
fourth element, whether there is probable cause to believe the extraditee
commited the crime charged. The role of an extradition magistrate, in
this respect, has been likened to that of a judge in the preliminary hear-
ing at a criminal trial.46
Assuming that the four elements outlined above are satisfied, the
court will grant the extradition request. Under present law, no direct ap-
peal is permitted.4 7 However, the extraditee may challenge the legality of
his confinement by applying for a writ of habeas corpus. 48 The scope of
habeas review, however, is very limited.4
9
2. Role of the Executive
The executive branch "operates at both ends of the system."50 It rep-
resents the first obstacle to a successful extradition request since the re-
quest must survive executive inspection.5 1 At the final stage in the process
48 Id.
44 Note, Bringing The Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 71, 80 (1978). This requirement is known as the double criminality principle and
is imposed in order that "a person's liberty is not restricted as a consequence of offenses not
recognized as criminal by the requested state." L SHEARER, supra note 3, at 137.
48 See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
46 Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 462, 463 (1889). Section 3184 of the present ex-
tradition law states that a magistrate shall grant the extradition request if "he deems the
evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or conven-
tion." Extradition Act, supra note 32. By itself, § 3184 does not state the nature of evidence
sufficient to justify extradition. However, each of the extradition treaties to which the
United States is a party states that "extradition shall take place only if the evidence against
the fugitive is sufficient to justify commitment for trial had the offense been committed in
the requested State." M. BAssiouNi, supra note 34, at 516 (1974). The federal courts have
construed this language to require a probable cause standard. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309
(1922). For a discussion of the distinction between a guilt standard and a probable cause
standard, see id. at 316-17.
4' The Department of State is similarly barred from appealing an extradition denial to
an appellate court. The Senate bill, however, would permit direct appeal by both parties.
See S. 220, supra note 40, at § 3195.
48 Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
49 See Galina v. Fraser, 177 F. Supp. 856, 860 (D. Conn. 1959) for discussion of the
elements of h beas review of a decision to grant extradition.
M. BA ,MOUNI, supra note 34, at 531.
51 Id.
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it exercises executive discretion over judicial decisions adverse to the
extraditee.52
Executive discretion was first exercised in 1871 and judicially recog-
nized two years later in In Re Stupp13 When the judiciary denies the
extradition request the process is formally over, except forepossible refil-
ings by the executive.54 Once the court grants extradition, however, the
executive can undertake a de novo examination to determine whether the
requirements of the treaty have been met.53 This examination is not lim-
ited to the record and quite often the executive will uncover more evi-
dence than would otherwise be obtained through judicial review.56
U.S. extradition law commits the resolution of certain issues solely to
the executive branch. The executive has exclusive authority to determine
whether an extradition request is politically motivated 57 or whether an
82 Id.
53 23 Fed. Cas. 281 (No. 13562) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1873). Before 1842 the United States
maintained an executive system of extradition. Its first extradition treaty, the Jay Treaty of
1794, failed to indicate which branch was to administer extradition proceedings. Absent pro-
vision for judicial participation, the executive freely surrendered individuals without judicial
hearing. It was not until the surrender of Robbins to Great Britain that criticism arose over
the unfettered discretion of the executive. Robbins' surrender drew bitter criticism because
of the denial of a judicial hearing. The Webster-Ashbruton Treaty, drafted partly to quiet
this criticism, was not soon enough to avert the ouster of Adams administration. The dis-
quiet over the Robbins case and the subsequent adoption of the judicial method by treaty in
1842 and by statute in 1848 is said to indicate a view held by America at the time that
"surrender without judicial hearing" is opposite to that basic principle of constitutionalism.
S. BEDi, supra note 15, at 137.
The proposal before the Senate is not necessarily contrary to constitutionalism. S. 220,
supra note 40, retains judicial control over the bulk of the extradition process while with-
drawing the political offense issue from judicial determination if it is at all raised by the
extraditee.
' Lubet & Czackes, The Role of The American Judiciary in the Extradition of Politi-
cal Terrorists, 71 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, at 199 (1980).
55 Id. The Secretary has broad discretion to deny extradition after a judicial grant of
extradition. For a discussion of the bases of executive discretion see Note, Executive Discre-
tion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313 (1962). Furthermore, the Secretary can attach
conditions to the surrender of the accused. For example, the Secretary may stipulate that
there be no trial for a crime other than that for which the accused is extradited. For discus-
sion of this and other possible conditions see S. BEDI, supra note 15, at 149-155.
56 Lubet & Czackes, supra note 54, at 199. Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition,
62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1328 n.116 (1962).
" Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir. 1981). The focus of the judge's inquiry is
the crime itself, and the context in which it was committed. The executive, on the other
hand, determines whether the requesting state may have had some ulterior motive for the
request. Its decision will necessarily require its opinion of the honesty or dishonesty of the
requesting state. The judge's analysis does not implicate the honesty of any official act of
the requesting state-inquiry is purely a question of fact-either the crime was committed
in connection with a violent political disturbance or it was not. Id.
Two reasons underly judicial deference with regard to the determination of the political
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extraditable fugitive should be withheld for humanitarian reasons." If the
fugitive presents evidence on these questions in the extradition proceed-
ing, the court is obligated to defer to the executive branch."
The executive and the judiciary share concurrent authority to.deter-
mine whether the accused has committed a political crime for which he is
exempt from extradition. 0 Under present law the courts will make this
determination in the first instance.6 1 Executive discretion depends upon
how the issue is resolved by the courts. If the court finds the political
offense exception applicable, the executive cannot reverse this decision.
However, if the court finds the political offense exception inapplicable,
the executive can reverse the court and withhold the accused on the
ground that he is a political offender.2
Under the proposed method, the political offense exception would be
shifted from the executive's concurrent jurisdiction to its exclusive juris-
diction. As a result, the executive would gain the authority to deny the
applicability of the political offense exception.
D. Limits on Executive Discretion over Extradition
1. Constitutional Constraints
It is often stated that the executive decision to extradite is purely
discretionary. This discretion is derived from Article II of the Constitu-
tion which empowers the executive to make and enforce treaties, includ-
ing those pertaining to extradition."3 While the executive's authority to
enforce treaties acknowledges no limitations in Article II, due process
concerns may provide an implict limitation on the exercise of executive
motivation of the request. First, the Constitution empowers the executive to execute trea-
ties. U.S. CONST. art. II § 2. When the executive is deciding whether a request was made for
political reasons, he is, in effect, deciding whether the provisions of the pertinent extradition
treaty are being observed. The making of an extradition request, neutral on its face but
actually politically motivated, is a violation of the treaty. In effect, the crime alleged is a
mere pretext for the extradition of an individual for a non-extraditable offense.
Second, under the Act of State doctrine, the judiciary is barred from looking behind the
official acts of foreign governments to find unworthy motives. Judicial inquiry into the mo-
tives of the requesting states was just the kind of inquiry the doctrine was intended to
prevent. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
Given a politically motivated request, the executive can deny the request, effectively
short-circuiting the judicial process. It can also do so after the request has been granted by
the magistrate under the rubric of executive discretion. Note, Executive Discretion in Ex-
tradition, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1313, 1323 (1962).
" Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247 (4th Cir. 1976).
,See supra note 53.
'o 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d, at 513.
*1 Eain v. Wilkes, 64 F.2d at 513.
"I. SHEARER, supra note 3, at 199; M. BAssIouNI supra note 34, at 534.
63 U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
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discretion over extradition.
The decision to extradite represents a substantial interference with
the liberty of the fugitive. In some circumstances, extradition will subject
the fugitive to barbaric treatment in the requesting state. Ordinarily, the
government must provide a hearing of some sort when it contemplates an
action which would deprive an individual of liberty to that extent.
Present extradition law explicitly provides for judicial involvement in
the extradition process.64 It is unclear, however, whether judicial involve-
ment is required as a matter of due process, and if so, what issues must
be judicially determined. Few cases have examined this question because
a judicial hearing is presently statutorily required.
Case law in an area analogous to extradition provides some measure
of guidance on this question. The Supreme Court has held that due pro-
cess is applicable in deportation cases. 5
Like the government's power to extradite, the power to deport is
viewed as a plenary power"6 vested in the political branches of the gov-
ernment.67 This power is based on a notion of self-preservation inherent
in sovereignty that permits a sovereign nation to "forbid the entrance of
foreigners within its dominion or to admit them only upon such condi-
tions as they see fit to prescribe."6
After Fong Yue Ting v. United States,6 9 the plenary nature of the
right to expel was thought to insulate the deportation process from con-
stitutional safeguards. Under that opinion, Congress could deport aliens
"whenever in its judgment their removal is necessary or expedient for the
public interest. '7 0
In a later case, the Supreme Court retreated from this extreme posi-
tion. In the Japanese Immigrants Case,7 1 the court held that the Fifth
Amendment was applicable to deportation proceedings and that adminis-
trative officers responsible for the execution of deportation law must ob-
serve "the fundamental principles that inhere in 'due process of law.' "
At the same time, the court narrowly construed the due process rights of
the deportee, saying:
no person shall be deprived of his liberty without the opportunity at
some time to be heard before such officers in respect of matters on which
- 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1948).
"5 Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 550 (1953); See also United States v. Shaugh-
nessy, 187 F.2d 137, 141 (2nd Cir. 1951).
:6 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893).
7 Id. at 713.
68 Id. at 705.
" 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
70 Id. at 724.
71 189 U.S. 86 (1903). The docket title was Yamataya v. Fisher.
72 Id. at 100.
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liberty depends-not necessarily an opportunity upon a regular set occa-
sion and according to the forms of judicial procedure but one that will
secure the prompt, vigorous action contemplated by the Congress and at
the same time be appropriate to the nature of the case upon which such
officers are required to act.
7 3
The line of deportation cases show that due process concerns have
increased through the years, but not to the point where a deportee is con-
stitutionally entitled to a judicial hearing. Extradition bears some resem-
blance to deportation, yet different policies underly extradition and
therefore the expulsion cases can be distinguished. As the Court said in
Fong Yue Ting. v. United States:
Strictly speaking . . . "extradition," and "deportation," although each
has the effect of removing a person from the country, are different
things, and have different purposes.... ."Extradition" is the surrender to
another country of one accused of an offense against its law, there to be
tried, and, if found guilty, punished. "Deportation" is the removal of an
alien out of the country, simply because his presence is deemed inconsis-
tent with the public welfare, and without any punishment being imposed
or contemplated, either under the laws of the country out of which he is
sent, or of those of the country to which he is taken.'
Inasmuch as the possible effect of extradition is to subject the extraditee
to barbaric treatment in the requesting state, it is clear that a much
greater degree of process is due the extraditee than the deportee.
One case has held that a fugitive is constitutionally entitled to a
hearing and a judicial determination of the basis for extradition.7 5 The
case suggests that executive power in the area of extradition is not with-
out restriction.
In Sayne v. Shipley,"8 the defendant committed armed robbery in
the Republic of Panama and fled immediately into the Canal Zone. A
regulation of the Canal Zone, then a U.S. possession, provided for extra-
dition of fugitives upon the request of the demanding state but failed to
73 Id.
74 Fong Yue Ting. v. United States, 149 U.S. at 709.
75 Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969). Unlike a criminal case, the purpose of
an extradition proceeding is not to adjudicate the guilt or innocence of the extraditee. Aside
from the determination of a few legalistic technicalities, the predominant purpose of the
proceeding is to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the extraditee
committed the offense charged. Id. at 685. Accordingly, the extraditee may not present ex-
culpatory evidence which bears upon the issue of whether the extraditee should stand trial
in the requesting country. Id. Since the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused will not
be determined at the extradition proceeding, the Sixth Amendment has been held not appli-
cable. See United States v. Galanis, 429 F. Supp. 1215 (D. Conn. 1977).
76 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969).
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provide for an automatic right to a judicial hearing." The defendant was
taken into custody by Canal Zone authorities pending extradition to The
Republic of Panama. The defendant then petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of the Canal
Zone. The petition was denied. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
Canal Zone Code, in failing to accord the defendant an automatic hearing
before a judicial officer, violated his due process rights. The court held
that a full habeas coipus hearing was due process to the defendant, even
though the hearing occurred after an executive decision to extradite.71 To
the court, the important consideration was not when the hearing oc-
curred, but whether the individual had recourse to the courts to ensure
compliance with the treaty and statute.7 9
While the court held that some kind of judicial review was required,
although not necessarily in the first instance, the most significant part of
the decision is the nature of the habeas review accorded the extradition
order in the case. The lower court in Sayne gave a full hearing "on all
issues that would have been pertinent to extradition proceedings pursu-
ant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184."80 In that sense, it was identical to a judicial
hearing in the first instance but merely given after the extradition order
entered by the executive.
it is unclear whether to regard Sayne as an anomaly. Sayne is alone
in holding that a fugitive is constitutionally entitled to a judicial hearing
prior to his extradition. The problem with Sayne is that the principle it
articulates-that an extraditee is constitutionally entitled to a judicial
hearing prior to his extradition-does not admit of easy limitation. Sayne
provides no guidance as to what issues must be determined judicially.
Taken to its extreme, Sayne establishes a constitutional right to a hear-
ing on all issues pertaining to extradition. This is clearly not the case. For
example, the executive regularly determines!; the motivation of the request
to determine whether the request is fraudulent."' It has never been ar-
gued that unreviewable executive determinations regarding the political
motivations of the request violate the extraditee's due process rights.
Other examples of unreviewable executive determinations can be
posited. 2
In summary, while one case has held that a judicial hearing of some
sort is required previous to extradition, some issues can be conclusively
C.Z. Code tit. 6, § 5082 (1963).
78 Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d at 686.
7 Id.
i0 Id.
81' 'See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text.
" For example, the courts have said it is for the executive to determine whether the
extraditee should not be extradited on the ground that he would not receive a fair trial in
the requesting state.
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determined by the executive without judicial review. Thus, when contem-
plating the advisability of vesting the political offense exception in the
executive domain, it is important to remember that, as a matter of consti-
tutional law, this is permissible. The Congress "may call in the aid of the
judiciary to ascertain any contested facts on which an alien's right to be
in the country has been made by Congress to depend" 3 as Congress has
done with respect to extradition, but this is a question of policy, not con-
stitutional obligation.
2. International Obligations
Absent an applicable provision in a treaty, Congress is free to imple-
ment extradition in any manner it pleases. Most treaties do not specify
which organ of government is to execute the extradition obligations
therein.8 However, in the last few years, three treaties to which the
United States is a party have vested the executive with exclusive author-
ity to administer the political offense exemption.8 5
Extradition is viewed as a matter of domestic jurisdiction and there-
fore not a principle of international law.88 Thus, while international law
permits and favors the refusal of extradition of persons for offenses of a
political character,'87 states are free, absent treaties, to extradite individu-
als adjudged or viewed to be political offenders." As a result the states
have variously interpreted the scope of the political offense doctrine.
"Some countries interpret the concept broadly so as to protect the indi-
vidual, while others consider a strict interpretation more consonant with
the requirement of international cooperation."89 What may be a political
offense in one country is a common crime in another.90
Similar discretion inheres in the states to implement extradition
treaties and while some employ an executive method of rendition, the
vast majority judicially administer their extradition obligations.91
83Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. at 174.
"I. SHERma6 supra note 3, at 197.
" Those treaties are Extradition Treaty United States-Mexico, May 4, 1978, arL 5(1),
31 U.S.T. ., T.LA.S. 9656, S. Doc. No. 33, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Senate ratification
of U.S.-Netherlands Extradition Treaty) and S. Doc. No. 33, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. (1981)
(Senate ratification of U.S.-Columbia treaty).
" Garcia-Mora, supra note 14, at 1227.
87 J. MooRE, supra note 1.
" Garcia-Mora, supra note 14, at 1228.
" Id.
SO Id. at 1229 n. 13..
92 S. BEni, supra note 15, at 136.
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E. The Substantive Common Law Approach
Political offenses are of two types: pure and relative. Pure political
offenses include treason, sedition and, often, espionage.92 Relative politi-
cal offenses are harder to define because they are common crimes that
most often have political motivations.9 3 Evaluation of the political ele-
ments of relative political offenses is a difficult process, involving ques-
tions of ideology, morality and human rights."
Anglo-American courts have developed a test for determining
whether the extraditee's act was a relative political offense. In Re Cas-
tioni9 5 first articulated this test. Castioni, a native of the Swiss canton of
Ticino, fatally shot a cantonal government official. The murder took place
when Castioni, as part of a large crowd opposed to the government's poli-
cies, stormed and occupied the seat of government.98 The court refused to
extradite Castioni to Switzerland because a political uprising existed at
the time and place of the offense and because the offense committed was
incidental to and in furtherance of the uprising.9 Thus, the court con-
cluded that Castioni's act was a political offense and denied extradition.
This two-part political incidence test was incorporated into American
case law in 1894 in In Re Ezeta.98 Ezeta, vice-president and commander-
in-chief of the army of Salvador, was charged with murder in the hanging
death of a young man accused of being a spy during the revolution
against his government.9 9 The court ruled that the offense occurred dur-
ing a state of seige and that Ezeta was seeking to maintain the authority
of the government against a revolutionary uprising. 00 Under the political
incidence test, Ezeta was not extradited. The test has been consistently
applied by American courts since Ezeta.101
F. The Recent Cases
New patterns of international crime, particularly international ter-
rorism, have complicated the courts' efforts to apply the Castioni test.
"I Garcia-Mora, supra note 5, at 375.
'4 Id. at 377.
1 L. OPPNHmm, supra note 2, at 646; L SHEARR, supra note 3, at 187; Evans, Reflec-
tions Upon the Political Offense in International Practice, 57 Am. J. InT'L L. 1, 21 (1963).
'4 1 Q.B. 149 (1891).
Id. at 150-151.
Id. at 158-160.
95 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
"Id. at 976 et seq.
100 Id. at 1002.
101 E.g., Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959); Karadzole v. Antukovic, 170
F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962); Garcia-
Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971); Escobedo v. United States, 623
F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Critics are concerned that a dispassionate, objective analysis by the judi-
ciary of the character of the extraditee's offense will result in the inclu-
sion of terrorism within the meaning of the political offense exception.102
Three recent extradition cases have brought this criticism to its head.
In In Re McMullen,0 3 a former member of the Irish Republican
Army (IRA) sought by the United Kingdom on charges related to an IRA
bombing of a military barracks was not extradited. This offense was
deemed political under the political incidence test. The magistrate found
that the conflict in northeastern Ireland was a political uprising and that
an attack on such a military target was incidental to and part of that
uprising. 04
In Eain v. Wilkes,10 5 a member of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) was sought by Israel for murder and related offenses in con-
nection with the PLO bombing of a youth rally in the Israeli city of
Tiberias which killed two young men and injured 27 others. The magis-
trate characterized the struggle in the Middle East between Israel and the
Palestinians as a political conflict.108 Eain, however, was extradited, be-
cause the magistrate ruled that an act of random terrorism against indis-
criminate targets was not incidental to the conflict, and was therefore a
common offense.107 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a holding that terrorist
acts do not bear sufficient relationship to stated political goals and thus
cannot be in furtherance of a political uprising.108
Finally, in December 1981, the Second Circuit in United States v.
Mackin,109 affirmed the findings of a magistrate1 who refused to extra-
dite Desmond Mackin, a member of the IRA charged by the United King-
dom with the attempted murder of a British soldier in Belfast.1 As in
McMullen, the conflict in northeastern Ireland was characterized as a po-
litical contest over control of the state. The offense was held to be inci-
dental to that contest.112
The results of these three cases put the problem in perspective. Each
case involved a crime committed against a U.S. ally. Each crime was of an
102 See generally DEP'T oF STATE, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (A. Ev-
ans and J. Murphy eds. 1978).
103 No. 3-78-1099-MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979). See description of McMullen in Note,
American Courts and Modern Terrorism: the Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. I'L
POL 617, 637-38 (1980).
104 Id.
100 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
106 Id. at 520.
2l0 Id.
10 Id. at 520-523.
1- 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
110 No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981).
1 668 F.2d at 122.
212 Id.
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extremely violent nature. The courts in McMullen and Mackin denied
extradition. The court in the Bain case granted the request.
The specific criticisms of current judicial practice fall into three
groups. First, critics contend that the determination of whether an of-
fense is political is a decision which is intrinsically political, intimately
connected with foreign policy and as such without objective criteria.1 13
The courts are considered an inappropriate forum for such a decision,
which is usually made by the Executive.114 Second, judicial determination
of whether an offense is political has potentially adverse foreign policy
consequences because courts will sometimes rule against friendly na-
tions. 1 5 When a court analyzes the political setting of a friendly nation
and decides that a political uprising exists, embarrassment to the U.S.
Government results."8 Finally, the judicial method is viewed as unsuited
to the control of "international terrorism.' 1 7 If a U.S. court should char-
acterize a terrorist act as a political offense, terrorists might be en-
couraged to seek haven in this nation." 8 Furthermore, a judicial charac-
terization of such acts as political may be regarded as an American
endorsement of terrorism, contrary to our official posture condemning
terrorism.
M. ANALYsIs
Much of the controversy concerning the current administration of
the political offense doctrine is attributable to the disparate nature of the
values extradition was designed to serve. One author has argued that a
framework for extradition should serve five values:
(1) the recognition of the "national interest" of the states who are parties
to the extradition proceeding;
(2) the international duty to preserve and maintain world public order;
(3) the effective application of minimum standards of fairness and justice
to the relator in the extradition process;
(4) a collective duty on the part of all states to combat criminality;, and
(5) the balancing of these factors within the juridicial framework of the
"Rule of Law."' 11"
I's Memorandum on Extradition Legislation, 127 Cong. Rec. § 9954, § 9956 (daily ed.,
Sept. 18, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum].
1124 Id.
1 Judicial decision in political offense cases can have "a devastating impact on United
States relations with the requesting country." Id.
116 A court is not "an appropriate or desirable forum for a careful analysis of a friendly
foreign state's intention or political system." Id.
117 Id.
I" Id. and n.61 at § 9959.
119 M. BAssIouNi, supra note 34, at 222.
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Perhaps in a system of extradition not providing for the political crimes
exception, each of the values set forth above could be faithfully served.
Yet, even this is unlikely since the results dictated by any two values are
bound to conflict. The presence of the political offense concept will neces-
sarily make matters worse. For example, strict adherence to the duty to
preserve and maintain world public order would mean that states would
extradite political offenders without exception. And further, pursuit of
shortsighted national interest, if unregulated, would effectively subsume
the political offense doctrine.
It is therefore a fair assumption that a system of extradition, however
conceived, cannot hope to serve all factors in all respects. The best sys-
tem of extradition, as a practical matter, should be designed to accommo-
date as many interests as possible in the order of their importance in the
particular case.
The prevailing criticism of the present system of extradition focuses
on the unacceptability of certain results reached by the courts. 12 0 It is an
overreaction, however, to vest the executive with exclusive and unreview-
able authority over the political offense exception. To do so would
amount to a tacit repeal of the political offense exception as it presently
exists.121 A better solution would be to retain jurisdiction in the courts to
insure that the political offense decision is made neutrally and objec-
tively, and adopt a legal test that would eliminate these unacceptable
results.
The balance of this note is an effort to illuminate the problems with
an executive determination of the political offense exception and to
demonstrate the ability of the courts to make political offense determina-
tions. The note will also consider alternatives to the present administra-
tion of the exception and point out their deficiencies when compared to
the status quo.
A. Decisionmaking Considerations Relied Upon By Each Branch
1. State Department: Immediate Foreign Policy Needs
The Secretary of State's central function is to implement foreign pol-
icy in a manner that will maximize state interests.1 22 Only rarely do ideo-
120 See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text.
12 "State interests" are the conditions which seem to be necessary or desirable to the
survival and flourishing of the state. J. WAKXLIN, THE RooTS OF DIPLOmACY 18 (1965). "Most
statesmen see it as their duty to put national interest first ... Thus, the student of inter-
state relations should not normally be misled about the claims of statesmen to be acting for
the good of humanity, or resisting anti-Christ, or for Communism, or for Buddhism. He
should normally be able to explain a state's move by showing how it was those responsible
for it hoped by it to secure or extend the national interest." Id. at 134-135.
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logical concerns, such as the promotion of liberty, motivate diplomats. 23
The Secretary will invariably consider the national and strategic interests
of the United States as the predominant factor in political offense deci-
sions. Given the predilection of U.S. policymakers to perceive the support
of authoritarian regimes as consistent with the national interest, it is un-
likely that motives such as the promotion of political liberty and the re-
fusal to abet foreign political repression will receive significant
consideration.'2 '
State Department determinations of the nature of the extraditee's
offense will emphasize the values of political and diplomatic expediency,
to the exclusion or minimization of fairness and justice. The emphasis in
political offense decision-making would shift from the actual, objective
nature of the claimed political offense to the extrinsic effects of the char-
acterization itself.
Expediency considerations would alter the political offense exception
in four ways. First, the Secretary's approach to the exception would result
in two standards: one for friendly nations and one for other nations. One
argument offered in support of exclusive executive jurisdiction over the
political offense issue is that court rulings sometimes offend friendly na-
tions and that this problem will be solved if the Secretary characterizes
the extraditee's claimed political act.125 This implies that friendly nations
will not disapprove of the Secretary's decisions because the Secretary will
not rule against them. However, this overt dualism will weaken American
credibility as a defender of political liberty.
Secondly, having the executive decide the political offense exception
may encourage state terrorism.126 United States v. Gonzales 27 illustrates
I" "If we are to believe what statesmen say, they have been motivated frequently not
by interest so much as by desire to serve the cause they believe to be right and to defend a
certain way of life. In practice, however, it is hard to find occasions where statesmen have
long acted in defiance of national interest, whereas it is easy to find occasions where ideolog-
ically opposed states have been aligned for reasons of national interest." Id.
1 Of course, any opposition between U.S. national interest and support of human
rights may be overstated. A foreign policy that encourages human rights abroad may be
entirely consistent with the national interest. S. VOGELGESANG, AmumcAN DRAM, GLOBAL
NIHTmxAR 264-271 (1980).
123 Executive determination "permits a more informed decision on extradition to be
made in a manner less likely to be offensive to the friendly foreign government in the
case." Memorandum, supra note 113, at § 9956 (Emphasis added.)
12 State terrorism is simply the commission of terrorist acts by governments. Famous
examples include "the Spanish Inquisition, St. Bartholomew's Massacre (24 August 1572),
the Reign of Terror in Revolutionary France (1793-94), the Fascist's 'squadrons' in the
1920s, Stalinism, and the so-called forms of 'vigilantism' ... such as OAS terrorism for
maintaining French sovereignty in Algeria." Bonante, Some Unanticipated Consequences of
Terrorism, 16 J. OF PEACE RasnARCH 197, 199 (1979).
127 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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this problem. The extraditees were high-ranking Honduran military of-
ficers whose government was overthrown by popular rebellion. They were
sought on charges alleging that they tortured and killed two rebel prison-
ers during the course of the rebellion. Initially, the Secretary of State re-
fused the extradition request on the ground that the offense was politi-
cal.s The court, however, ruled that the offense was not political because
the torture was not sufficiently related to the political goal of defending
the existing government.12' Gonzales was therefore extradited. Gonzales
suggests that excessive or barbaric crimes committed by friendly but op-
pressive regimes for which extradition is later sought would very likely be
classified as political offenses by the Secretary of State. Such determina-
tions would encourage state terrorism, contrary to the official American
policy of suppressing terrorism.
Thirdly, characterization of the offense by the Secretary would be
overinclusive since it would result in the extradition of genuine political
offenders, both peaceful and military. Violent and non-violent opponents
of authoritarian regimes friendly to the United States would probably be
deported as common criminals for crimes related to political opposition.
Support of authoritarian, anticommunist regimes in the Third World is
viewed as important to our national security interest.130 The repressive
character of such governments often generates considerable internal dis-
sent,1 31 manifested by both violent and nonviolent political opposition.
The Secretary would have a strong policy disincentive to characterize
such offenses as political and the Secretary would be unlikely to allow
opponents of friendly governments to escape extradition as political
offenders.132
12 Id.
129 Id.
140 Cohen, Human Rights Decision-Making in the Executive Branch: Some Proposals
for a Coordinated Strategy, in Hum. RTs. & Am. FOREIGN POL'Y 216, 229 (D. Kommers & G.
Loescher eds. 1979).
121 "[P]olitical crimes are committed by the best of patriots and, what is of more
weight, they are in many cases a consequence of the oppression on the part of the respective
governments." 1 L. OPPENHEim, quoted in Proceedings, supra note 2, at 160.
in The probable characterization of political crimes as common offenses would operate
against both violent and nonviolent political dissidents. This would surely occur in the case
of a violent political opponent. Violence, though abhorrent and condemned by the United
States as a means of political reform, is often the tool of political change of last resort. It
has resulted in the political independence of many nations,* including the United States.
Therefore, extraditing violent political offenders may not be an unqualified good. The same
expediency-motivated results might also obtain in cases where a nonviolent opponent is
sought for extradition. Many opponents of friendly but authoritarian regimes are in the
United States and could therefore be vulnerable to extradition. The extradition of such in-
dividuals as common criminals would create a disincentive in these nations to engage in
nonviolent political strategies.
1983
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Finally, the power to characterize the extraditee's offense might be
used as a bargaining chip in the daily course of international diplomacy.
This could result in defendant-swapping in which the United States and
the requesting state might discreetly agree to exchange extraditees.133 In
such a case, the diplomatic value of the exchange would tend to over-
shadow the merits of either extraditee's claim. Furthermore, State De-
partment determinations of the political offense exception might result in
more obvious abuses, such as the delivery of a political opponent of a
harsh but oil-rich government in return for oil.
a. Executive Discretion in a Similar Area
The State Department's discriminatory application of its power to
deny visas lends support to the preceding analysis. In its review of visa
applications from Irish nationals, for example, the State Department has
discriminated for reasons of diplomatic and political expediency.13 ' Such
a discriminatory policy is possible only by spurious application of statu-
tory exclusion rules to certain individuals. Of course, it is clear that a
distinction exists between the denial of a visa, which merely forbids an
alien to enter the United States, and the approval of extradition, which
will usually subject the alien to criminal punishment. Nevertheless, the
foreign policy and diplomatic impact of the two decisions are similar.
Furthermore, given executive determination of the political offense excep-
tion, the Secretary would have the same broad discretion in political of-
fense cases that now exists in visa cases.
Congress has directed the State Department to exclude certain clas-
ses of people from admission to the United States.13 5 Among the classes
denied admission are the mentally infirm, those convicted of crimes of
moral turpitude, polygamists, prostitutes, anarchists and communists.113
Since the renewal of violence in northeastern Ireland, the State De-
partment has consistently denied entry visas to Irish nationals who are
either Irish Republicans or members of the political party, Sinn Fein."
Visas have been denied to these individuals on the ground that their ad-
13 Letter of Christopher Pyle, Assoc. Prof., Dept. of Politics, Mt. Holyoke College, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 11, 1982, at A18, col. 3.
13 COMMITrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 2D SnsS., NORTHERN IRELAND: A ROLE FOR
THE UNrra STATES? (Comm.-Print 1978) [hereinafter cited as NORTHERN IRELAND].
235 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(1).
Ise 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)-(31) sets out the classes of aliens denied admission to the
United States.
237 Sinn Fein, the oldest existing Irish political party and the only one operating
throughout Ireland, favors national unification. See 0. MACARDLE, THE IRISH REPuBLIc 65
(4th ed. 1951) and J. BELL, THE SEcRET ARm: THE IRA 1916-1979 16-26 (2d ed. 1980).
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mission is inconsistent with public welfare;138 often their only infirmity
was political advocacy.189 At the same time, Northern Irish loyalists, 140
including members of the violent paramilitary Ulster Defense Associa-
tion, have been granted entry visas.141 This approach is overtly dualistic
since groups of similar tactics (violent rhetoric coupled with actual use of
violence) are treated dissimilarly.142
Clearly, such discrimination is based on political and diplomatic ex-
pedience considerations. Irish Republicans oppose the presence of Brit-
ain, a close American ally, in Ireland. Loyalists support the British pres-
ence. In order to prevent British enemies from engaging in propaganda on
behalf of their interests in the United States, the State Department has
used its legislatively conferred discretion to deny visas to members of one
political group, while granting visas to members of another, whose inter-
ests are not inimical to an ally.
There is no reason to conclude that diplomatic expediency would
play a less important role in political offense cases.1 43 Inconsistency in the
granting of visas is perhaps intellectually unappealing but it does not im-
pair the fundamental liberty or well-being of the party denied a visa.
1 The specific passages under which the Irish nationals have been excluded are 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27):
"Aliens who the consular officer or the Attorney General knows or has reason to
believe seek to enter the United States solely, principally, or incidentally to en-
gage in activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger
the welfare, safety, or security of the United States;"
and § 1182(a)(28)(F):
Aliens who advocate or teach or who are members of or affiliated with any organi-
zation that advocates or teaches... (ii) the duty, necessity or propriety of the
unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers (either of specific individuals
or of officers generally) of the Government of the United States or of any other
organized government, because of his or their official character, or (iii) the unlaw-
ful damage, injury or destruction of property, or (iv) sabotage ....
"I" N.Y. Times, Dec. 17, 1981.
140 Loyalists are residents of northeastern Ireland who favor continued British rule. For
an analysis of loyalists and loyalism, see G. BELL, THE PROTESTAms oF ULSTR (1976).
141 NORTHERN IRELAND, supra note 134, at 30-31.
242 Id. The pattern of discrimination has continued through 1981. In December, Owen
Carron, a Sinn Fein Member of Parliament from Fermanaugh-South Tyrone, was denied a
visa. N.Y. Times, December, 1981. During the same week, three associates of Ian Paisley
received visas to engage in a Loyalist publicity tour in the U.S. Paisley himself, however,
had his visa revoked under pressure from Irish-Americans and Congress. N.Y. Times, Dec.
22, 1981, at 5, col. 1. The denial of admission to both a prominent Republican and to a
prominent Loyalist may have been an attempt by the State Department to appear even-
handed. In fact, the pattern of discrimination continued since close associates of Paisley
were allowed to enter.
14s In fact, there may be a greater incentive in extradition cases because the State De-
partment then deals directly with the requesting state rather than merely with foreign na-
tionals, as in visa requests.
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However, the same discriminatory exercise of executive discretion in po-
litical offense cases would affirmatively impair the freedom of a politi-
cally-motivated offender. The United States would be delivering a politi-
cal opponent into the hands of the state which he opposes. In an area
where liberty is at stake, consistency and fairness should be considered
along with expediency and policy.144 Courts consider all these factors to
some degree. The Secretary of State would consider the latter predomi-
nately, if not exclusively. If these values conflict, the extradition law of a
democracy should be structured so as to favor consistency and fairness
over expediency and policy.'" Nonextradition of a political offender, after
all, need not constitute a U.S. embrace of the extraditee. He may be, and
often is, deported to another country. 4 6
2. Judiciary: A Multiplicity of Values
Courts generally apply the political incidence test in a politically
neutral manner. Courts analyze the objective and the factual setting of
the offense, without looking beyond these narrow facts to the underlying
ideological nature of the requesting state or of the extraditee's cause.
However, the courts will consider all competing values at stake in politi-
cal offense cases and will distribute determinative weight among them on
a case-by-case basis. 47 Accordingly, they sometimes ignore the results of
the common law test and rest their decisions on purely political factors,
such as the undesirability of sending an extraditee to a communist
nation. 48
The ideological justification of the political offense exception, the re-
luctance to aid in foreign political repression,' 49 might seem to require
courts to examine the specific political characteristics of both the request-
144 The judicial role in extradition was included in the Anglo-American Treaty of 1842
in order to guarantee that the rights of the accused be protected. Comment, Unraveling the
Gordian Knot: The United States Law of International Extradition and the Political Of-
fender Exception, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L. F. 141, 150 (1979). The restriction of the political
offense exception would be a severe blow to human rights. Garcia-Mora, The Columbian-
Peruvian Asylum Case and The Doctrine of Human Rights, 37 VA. L. REv. 927, 927-965
(1951).
145 "Founded as the government of the United States is, on the right to revolution to
surrender political offenders would be a dishonorable subserviency to a foreign power, and
an act meriting the reprobation of mankind." J. MooRE, supra note 1, at 305-306. "Every
doubt in a political offfense case ought to be resolved in favor of human liberty and not
against it." PROCEDMINGS, supra note 9, at 160.
146 Desmond Mackin, for example, was deported to the Republic of Ireland at the end
of the extradition proceedings. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1981, at 22, col. 5.
117 See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
148 See infra note 165.
149 See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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ing state and of the extraditee. If the political offense exception required
such an evaluation, the exception would merely be an exception for those
who oppose governments unfriendly to the United States. Instead, the
political offense exception is implemented in the essentially politically
neutral manner dictated by the political incidence test.
When applying the test, courts do not pass judgment on the ideologi-
cal proximity of the requesting state to the ideal of American democratic
government or on the ideological appeal of the extraditee and his cause.
Instead, the test requires the court to ascertain whether there is a politi-
cal conflict in the requesting state and whether the offense commited was
in furtherance of that conflict.150 Although these questions are charged
with political implications, the investigation necessary to answer them
does not involve a judicial evaluation of the ideological and political pos-
ture of the requesting state or of the extraditee.
The political neutrality of the judicial inquiry involved in political
offense cases is demonstrated in the McMullen,21 ' Eain,15 2 and Mackin5"
cases. In each case, the requesting state was a democratic nation closely
allied with the United States. Thus, the dissimilar results in the cases are
due to the objectively different nature of the offenses involved and not to
political distinctions. In Eain, the attack on a civilian youth rally was
deemed more common than political and, therefore, not incidental to a
political contest. 5 ' In McMullen and Mackin, the offenses charged were
attacks on military targets of a party directly involved in a political
contest.
155
The results of these cases do not indicate greater sympathy of the
United States, or even of federal magistrates, for the IRA than for the
PLO. Rather, they demonstrate the politically neutral and objectively
factual nature of the inquiry demanded by the political incidence test.
The reluctance to be an accomplice of a foreign government's persecution
of its political opponents applies with equal validity to any government.
The very inclusion of the political offense exception in all U.S. treaties,
even those with closely allied nations, bears out the political neutrality of
the inquiry.
Yet, in certain cases, the courts will base their decisions on political
considerations, if those considerations are compelling in a particular case.
A distinctive characteristic of the judicial determination of the political
offense exception is the ability of courts, in contrast to the Secretary of
11 See supra note 104.
151 No. 3-78-1099-MG (N.D. CaL May 11, 1979).
152 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
15 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
1 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
155 See supra notes 103-04 and 109-12 and accompanying text.
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State, to consider all of the values involved in extradition proceedings. A
standard application of the political incidence test will usually effectuate
a balance among the competing values of combatting criminality, main-
taining world public order and applying standards of fairness and justice.
Such balancing seems to exclude such factors as the national interest and
diplomatic and foreign implications. In practice, however, courts do con-
sider these factors and sometimes adjust their normally strict application
of the political incidence test to serve these values.
This process of flexibility and adjustment was at work in Karadzole
v. Artukovic.5 s The Yugoslav Government requested the extradition of a
former Croatian Government official who was charged with war crimes
against the civilian population during the Italo-German occupation. The
court ruled that the crimes for which extradition was requested were po-
litical and therefore not subject to extradition.157 This result is notable
because war crimes are generally not considered political offenses' 58 and
because under the political incidence test, the crimes could not have been
political since no political uprising or contest existed at the time of the
offense.
This seemingly anomalous result rested on foreign policy grounds.
The court refused to apply the common law because the communist's
control of Yugoslavia demanded that the test be relaxed so that "ordinary
crimes that have no political significance will thereby be excused."'15 9 In
other words, the court refused to apply the common law test where the
result would have been to ship the extraditee to a communist nation. The
Karadzole case demonstrates that values extraneous to the political inci-
dence test, such as foreign policy concerns, are considered by the courts
in exceptional cases. 160
Karadzole highlights the ability of courts to consider all the values at
stake in political offense cases, including questions of interest and expedi-
1-8 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
157 Id. at 203-204.
158 Garcia-Mora, supra note 5, at 394-396.
159 247 F.2d at 203. The court quoted from and largely relied on the British case, Ex
parte Kolczynski 1 All E.R. 31 (1954), in which a mutiny by Polish sailors who then sailed
to England and sought asylum was characterized a political offense notwithstanding the ab-
sence of a political uprising in Poland. The court declined to apply the political incidence
test in order to avoid sending the extraditees to a Communist nation.
'" The recent case of Eain v. Wilkes, also suggests that courts consider the entire range
of values at stake in political offense cases. A strict application of the political incidence test
in Eain might have resulted in the non-extradition of Eain. Instead, the court modified the
common law test to extradite Eain as a common criminal. This result was based on the
pragmatic concerns that a contrary result would encourage terrorists to seek haven in the
United States and that non-extradition in such cases would have undesirable domestic so-
cial consequences. Implicitly, the vulnerable position of a close ally was a basis of the deci-
sion. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 520.
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ency. Of course, courts will rule against the perceived, short-term national
and diplomatic interests, such as in Mackin. It is precisely, however, this
ability to consider all factors and to assign weight among them on a case-
by-case basis that distinguishes judicial determination from executive de-
termination where expediency considerations alone receive paramount
attention.
B. Practical Difficulties Inhering in Judicial Administration of the Po-
litical Offense Exception
1. Judiciary's Ability to Judge Political Facts
Judicial administration of the political offense exception has been
criticized on the ground that courts are unable to make political judg-
ments and therefore, should defer to the executive branch which has the
expertise and informational resources to make political determinations.161
This is plainly incorrect.162 The inquiry under the current formulation of
the political crimes defense is to determine whether "there was a violent
political disturbance in the requesting country at the time of the alleged
acts"1 63 and whether "the acts charged against the person whose extradi-
tion is sought was recognizably incidental to the disturbance."' " In mak-
ing a determination, the courts are essentially engaging in their tradi-
tional inquiry, perusing a record compiled through the efforts of the
parties, deriving findings of facts therein, and characterizing those facts
under the guidance of legal standards. Thus, in Eain, where the question
was whether the lower court's finding of conflict was sufficient to establish
that "there existed in Israel" a "violent political disturbance such as war,
revolution or rebellion,"165 the court looked at the nature of the conflict
between Israel and the PLO and concluded that such conflict was not
within the meaning of "violent political disturbance," since it did not in-
volve "on-going organized battles between contending armies.""" The
analysis in Lain did not require the court to take a position on the events
transpiring in the Middle East because the court was obliged merely to
determine whether a state of disturbance existed, within standards devel-
161 Memorandum, supra note 113, at § 9956.
I" That is not to say that judicial decisions with regard to the poltical offense excep-
tion will not have adverse foreign policy consequences. A denial of extradition on any
grounds is bound to have an adverse effect on the relations between the requesting and
requested states. Yet there is a distinction between the effect of the decision and the nature
of the inquiry, the former political in nature, the latter essentially factual.
in Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 516.
264 Id.
Id. at 519.
"e Id. The Eain case is also illustrative of the court's ability to use precedent in a way
that encourages reasoned, uniform decisions.
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oped by the courts, at the time the offense was committed.
Critics argue, however, that the State Department's superior infor-
mational resources foster the Secretary of State's appreciation of facts,
which are concededly judicially discoverable and therefore, makes the
State Department the better forum . 1 7 While unique resources may be
available to the executive, the State Department has made it a practice to
share such information with the courts during extradition proceedings"
and State Department officials have made themselves available for testi-
mony.169 Given this sharing of resources, it is hard to understand why a
diplomat, with substantially the same resources available to him as a
court, would make a superior determination of the facts.
It is evident that when a court makes findings of facts and judicial
determinations regarding the political offense issue, it is operating from
the same informational base and perception level as the State Depart-
ment if the State Department were to decide the issue. The determinative
factor, however, which separates judicial and executive determination is
the intrinsic benefits of judicial hearings. Judicial administration of the
political offense exemption retains the virtues which inhere in an adver-
sary system. The mark of an adversary system is a dispassionate neutral
judge making impartial findings of facts based upon the controversy be-
tween opposing parties.170 The adversary process is generally preferred to
an inquisitorial procedure. 7 1
Furthermore, the judicial process has the virtue of assuring a fair
hearing. The courts have long experience in conducting hearings. Al-
though it can be argued that in time the executive would gain the experi-
ence to conduct a fair hearing, under the domination of the Secretary of
State, the executive officer could not be impartial because he would be
required to conform his decision to the foreign policy dictates of the Sec-
retary. Under the newly proposed House and Senate bills the extraditee
would be entitled to a hearing 72 but the executive officer would assume
16? Memorandum, supra note 113, at § 9956.
1 Esin v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 514-15. Arguably, the State Department could withhold
information if that were suitable to its foreign policy ends. However, Congress could impose
a duty upon the State Department to provide the courts with information relevant to the
political offense issue. It could further authorize the courts to subpoena such information,
and provide that national security is no excuse to the subpoena, in view of the availability of
in camera review for the inspection of politically sensitive information.
le Id. at 515.
170 J. FRANK, COURTS ON TIuAL, 80-81 (1949).
171 "An adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combatting (the) nat-
ural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not yet fully
known." Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility, Report, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159, 1160
(1958).
171 H.R. 3347, supra note 40, at § 3194(a); S. 220, supra note 40, at § 3194(a).
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the position of both decisionmaker and prosecutor.173 Inevitably, loss of
impartiality results.
2. Foreign Policy Impact of Judicial Determinations of Political Of-
fense Exceptions
Ultimately, any decision concerning extradition, whoever the deci-
sion-maker, will affect the conduct of our foreign policy. This is more so
the case when the defendant has committed a particularly heinous crime
or when the offense is political in nature. The defendant's alleged crime
may have aroused public opinion in the requesting state, or the state may
wish to punish the defendant as an example for others or to ensure that
the availability of a haven will not encourage more crimes of that sort.
The stronger the requesting state's desire to punish the accused, the more
damaging the impact of a denial of its request.
With this in mind, critics of the present administration of the politi-
cal offense exception have argued that the judiciary should not adjudicate
the political offense exception.'" It is true that the executive is endowed
with the power to conduct foreign affairs.1175 However, courts have in the
past made decisions which affect sensitive political issues.17 6 Therefore,
the courts should not abstain from a case simply because their decision
may have political implications.
177
Judicial administration of the political offense exception can actually
help American foreign policy. Several commentators have argued that the
judicial administration of the political offense exception "permits the Ex-
278 HR. 3347, supra note 40, at § 3194(d)(2)(E) proposes the civil burden of preponder-
ance of the evidence, while S. 220, supra note 40, at § 3194(e) proposes the clear and con-
vincing evidence standard.
174 Memorandum, supra note 113, at § 9956. This argument proves too much. As any
extradition denial, whatever the ground relied upon, will foster ill will between the request-
ing and requested states, it is hard to understand why, under the critics' theory, the courts
should be involved in extradition at all.
175 The Supreme Court has described "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international rela-
tions." United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
178 See Youngstown v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (restricting executive discretion to
nationalize steel mills in time of war), and N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713
(1971) (permitting newspaper to publish the Pentagon Papers despite argument that publi-
cation undermines relations with allies).
177 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) the court specifically addressed the question of
the court's role in foreign affairs, saying- "(i)t is error to suppose that every case or contro-
versy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id. at 211. The judi-
cial abstention doctrine probably would not apply where, as here, Congress has authorized
the courts to answer political questions. Typically that doctrine is applied in situations
where judicial review would infringe upon executive or congressional power. Congressional
authorization makes this issue moot.
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ecutive branch to remove itself from political and economic sanctions
which might result if other nations believe the United States lax in the
enforcement of its treaty obligations.' ' 5
This, however, may be an overstatement. Typically, some states will
differentiate between judicial and executive determinations and some
states will not. Friendly nations know that the federal courts do not make
official U.S. foreign policy. They are, therefore, unlikely to regard an ex-
tradition decision as a reversal of foreign policy. Yet, it is reasonable to
assume that some nations will not make this distinction.
Even if it is conceded that judicial administration of the offense will
have a damaging impact on the relations between the requesting and re-
quested states, such damage will be minimal if the judiciary has correctly
applied the legal test. The institution of the political offense exception
presupposes a certain amount of conflict between the two states. Presum-
ably by including a political offense exception in the treaty itself, the par-
ties to the treaty envisioned situations when the requesting party's re-
quest for extradition would be denied on political offense grounds.
In the argument that the Secretary of State should decide the issue
even when the judicial result is correct, it is implied that the Secretary of
State would change what would otherwise be a correct result to accommo-
date the immediate interests of the requesting nation. The political of-
fense exception should not be administered simply to accommodate the
needs of the requesting state.
C. Alternatives to the Present Administration of the Defense
Various proposals have been made by Congress and commentators
relating to the exclusion of terrorists and hijackers from the protection of
the political offense exception and the elimination of judicial administra-
tion of the exception. Two such proposals have been set out below."'
178 Lubet & Czackes; supra note 54, at 200. See also Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 513;
SHEmARR, supra note 3, at 192; Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law
Approach, 11 CORNEL INT'L L. J. 71, 74 (1978). The considerations underlying the Federal
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) lend support to the proposition that judicial determina-
tions can often shield the executive from the adverse foreign policy consequences. The FSIA
was motivated, in part, to deal with this problem. Before the FSIA, a person who wanted to
sue a foreign government in a federal court had to first obtain the approval of the State
Department. While generally foreign sovereigns are immune from private suit, under certain
circumstances such a suit can be maintained. The State Department would determine
whether these circumstances were present. Often political factors were considered. On occa-
sion adverse foreign policy consequences would result. In response, Congress, through FSIA,
provided for judicial determination of sovereign immunity questions. Congressional thinking
was that judicial determinations would insulate the executive from reprisals of disaffected,
deimmunized nations.
179 A third proposal was offered by M. Cherif Bassiouni in a law review article. Bas-
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While both have merit, neither are preferable to the current system.
1. The Senate and House Bills: The Exclusion Approach
The Senate and House are presently considering two bills which re-
vise, in many respects, current extradition law. While both bills would
retain judicial jurisdiction over the political offense exception, each has
adopted an approach that would virtually abolish the exempt status of
the relative political offense.
The proposed bills adopt an exclusion approach. Each would categor-
ically exclude crimes involving certain disfavored elements from the pro-
tection of the political offense exception. The proposals provide that a
political offense does not normally include aircraft hijackings,180 offenses
against internationally protected persons,181 offenses for which a treaty
obligates the United States to extradite the accused, 182 offenses involving
the use of a firearm, 8 3 homicide, assault or kidnapping, narcotics re-
siouni, Ideologically Motivated Offenses and the Political Offense Exception in Extradi-
tion-A Proposed Juridical Standard, 19 DEPAUL L. Ray. 217 (1969). Professor Bassiouni
would remove the political offense defense from the decision making process of the nation-
states involved and endow an international court with exclusive jurisdiction over the de-
fense. Professor Bassiouni feels that the institution of international jurisdiction over the
political offense exception would minimize the political tensions resulting from domestic
administration of the exception. Id. at 257-258.
While the proposal has some merit, it is marred by practical defects inhering in interna-
tional bodies. With the exception of commercial matters involving private parties, interna-
tional tribunals are unable to enforce their decisions. Enforcement depends upon the coop-
eration of the parties involved. In the politicized atmosphere of an extradition proceeding, it
is unlikely the requested state will comply with a political offense decision adverse to its
interest Furthermore, since international bodies are typically polarized along East-West
lines, the requested state may tend to question the legitimacy of what it may call a politi-
cally tainted decision.
The defects in Professor Bassiouni's proposal tend to illuminate the benefits of wholly
domestic adjudication of the political offense exception. While the success of an interna-
tional tribunal depends upon the cooperation of states with disparate interests, decisions of
domestic courts are binding on the executive.
80 H.R. 6046, § 3194(e)(2)(A) (1982) and S. 220, supra note 40 at § 3194(e)(1)(A). [Ed.
note: The House Version now pending, H.R. 3347, supra note 40, has no comparable
provision.]
1 H.R. 3347, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(2)(A) and S. 220, supra note 40, at §
3194(e)(2)(C).
's8 H.R. 3347, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(2)(B) and S. 220 supra note 40, at §
3194(e)(2)(D).
I" H.R. 6046, § 3194(e)(2)(F) (1982) and S. 220, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(2)(B). [Ed.
note: The House version now pending, H.R. 3347 supra note 40, has no comparable
provision.]
H.R. 6046, § 3194(e)(2)(E) (1982) and S. 220, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(2)(A). [Ed.
note: The House version now pending, H.R. 3347, supra note 40, has no comparable
provision.]
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lated offenses,8 5 or conspiracy to commit any of the above offenses.1, 6
While the House Bill allows the fugitive to show that an offense within
the excluded categories should be included because of the extraordinary
circumstances in which it was committed,287 the Senate Bill would do so
only with respect to crimes involving homocide, assault or kidnapping, or
the use of a firearm or the conspiracy to commit any of those crimes.1 88
The proposed bills retain many of the advantages of judicial adminis-
tration of the defense, while eliminating the disadvantages associated
with executive determination. It removes terrorists from the protection of
the political offense exception without leaving the decision to the dictates
of diplomatic expedience8 9 and without subjecting the executive to possi-
ble criticism by disgruntled requesting states.1 90 The proposals, however,
are overbroad; while acts of terrorism should be put beyond the protec-
tions of the political offense exception, the bill is not narrowly drafted for
that purpose.
The adoption of either proposal would remove the relative political
offense from American extradition law. The blanket exclusion of all vio-
lent acts from the protection of the political offense exception will guar-
antee the extradition of terrorists at the expense of genuine political op-
ponents who resort to military tactics to meet their goals. This is at odds
with the Western notion of the right to rebel against oppression. 91 Given
the frequency and seriousness of political repression throughout the
world,192 it may be inappropriate for a democratic society to automati-
cally regard all violent political acts as common crimes subject to
extradition.
The historical justifications for the relative political offense exception
are still valid today. Individuals whose offenses are neither aimed at in-
discriminate targets nor disproportionate to their political goals pose no
threat to our government or social order.'9" The philosophical and ideo-
logical justifications underlying the defense are no less compelling today
than they were at the inception of the political offense exception. Many
185 S. 220, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(1)(E) and H.R. 3347, supra note 40, at
§ 3194(e)(2)(C).
18 H.R. 3347, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(2)(F) and S. 220, supra note 40, at
§ 3194(e)(1)(G).
187 H.R. 3347, supra note 40, at § 3194(e)(2).
S. 220, supra note 40, and § 3194(e)(2)(A-C).
188 See supra notes 131-155 and accompanying text.
190 See supra note 178.
191 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
192 Report submitted to the COMM. ON FOR. REL., U.S. SENATE AND THE COMM. ON For.
ArF., U.S. HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.,
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, passim. (Joint Comm. Print 1981).
193 . SHEARER, supra note 3, at 188; see also Garcia-Mora, Present Status, supra note
5, at 389.
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of the world's inhabitants resort to violence in pursuit of freedom and
justice; yet, free societies remain reluctant parties to their punishment."'
Humanitarian concerns for the extradition of political offenders persist,
especially given the widespread use of torture in other nations.195
To maintain that violence is ipso facto not political is idealistic and
ilusory.19s Violence permeates politics of all kinds. Governments rely on
the tacit threat and coercive force of violence in the form of armed forces
and police. 197 Political dissidents often resort to violence when provoked
by a violently repressive state.9" States are often founded through vio-
lence, and later extend and defend their interests and influence by vio-
lence.99 It is absurd to maintain that violent offenses cannot be political.
In conclusion, while the House and Senate proposals would fulfill the
purpose of preventing terrorists from escaping justice under the cloak of
the political offense exception, they would do so by destroying the rela-
tive political offense 0 and increasing the chances that genuine political
dissidents will be extradited to face political persecution at the hands of
the requesting state.
2. Judicially Reviewable Executive Decisions
Theoretically, vesting the executive with judicially reviewable author-
ity to administer the political offense exception would combine the bene-
fits of both executive and judicial determinations while allowing the val-
ues underlying each some weight.
1" A state "whose people have attained political liberty" is thought to have no interest
in protecting from "the advances of its own people" a foreign government that denies them
the most basic human rights. PROCEEDINGS, supra 9, at 160.
"' AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, passim.
'""Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," Mao Tse-Tung, in QUOTATIONS
FRoM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG 61 (2d Vest Pocket Ed. 1972).
197 FROM MAX WMnM ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 78-79 (H. Gerth & C. Mills eds. 1958).
19 Garcia-Mora, supra note 5, at 385.
2" They do so through war.
2o There are two additional defects in the proposal. First, it makes attempt and con-
spiracy common crimes. § 3194(e)(2)(B)(vii). These crimes tend to be vague and difficult to
prove. Thus, they would easily lend themselves to fabrication by the requesting state.
Second, § 3194(e)(2)(A) (iii), states that unlawful political advocacy, not advocating and
inciting violence, will normally be a political offense. By the maxim of statutory construc-
tion, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, this section impliedly makes advocacy which con-
dones or incites violence ipso facto a common offense. (As the maxim is applied to statutory
interpretation, where a form of "conduct ... (is) designated, there is an inference that all
omissions should be understood as exclusions." 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
123 (C.D. Sands ed. 1973)). Such a rigid classification is also susceptible of fabrication by
the requesting state. The doctrine of dangerous speech has been problematic in American
law; it would surely lend itself to abuse in the hands of an authoritarian requesting state
anxious to crack down on its opposition.
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Executive determination, in the first instance, gives recognition to
the national interest as a cognizable ingredient in the political offense de-
cision20 1 and takes advantage of the executive's more sophisticated appre-
ciation of the political situation in the requesting country. 2 At the same
time, the availability of judicial review assures that the non-national in-
terest concerns underlying the exception are not ignored.0 3 It also affords
the extraditee recourse in the event of an arbitrary executive
determination.
The essential difficulty with the proposed system is the formation of
a workable standard of review. One of the supposed advantages of the
proposal is that judicial review assures that all values underlying the po-
litical offense decision are considered. However, when the executive
makes his decision on the basis of national interest, to the exclusion of
other underlying values, the judiciary can give effect to the other values
only if it overturns the executive decision. Since reversal is necessary,
both sets of values cannot be given effect simultaneously, unless the re-
sults dictated by each happen to coincide.
The judiciary could conceivably construct a standard by which na-
tional interest concerns are balanced against non-national interest con-
cerns and effect is given to those concerns which are more weighty in the
particular case. For example, such a standard could protect national in-
terest concerns when they are compelling. The essential difficulty with
this standard is that the courts in judging the seriousness of the national
interest may be usurping the executive's power to determine national in-
terest in the area of foreign affairs.
The present system avoids this difficulty. While the courts do in
some instances evaluate the national interest,2°4 they typically give great
weight to executive testimony on the importance of the national inter-
est.205 Further, since the judiciary under the present system makes the
determination in the first instance, it is not compelled to evaluate the
propriety of an executive determination relating to an area which the
Constitution grants primary competence to the executive.201 The present
system provides for essentially the same benefits as the judicial review of
executive decision proposal. As we have seen the courts give effect to seri-
201 For discussion of national interest concerns underlying the political offense excep-
tion see supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
1011 See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
203 For delineation of non-national interest concerns underlying the political offense ex-
ception see supra note 119 and accompanying text.
204 Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957).
205 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir. 1981). The court said that State Depart-
ment testimony is given great, if not controlling, weight. However, the courts will sometimes
ignore that testimony where individual liberties were at stake.
200 See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-49 (1972).
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ous national interests while allowing other values precedence where na-
tional interest concerns are not serious.207 Furthermore, judicial determi-
nation allows for consideration of executive testimony which in some
circumstances provides the confidential information necessary to an in-
formed decision.208 In camera review has been used for this purpose.209
The present system, having many of the benefits of the executive deci-
sion-judicial review proposal and none of the deficiencies, is thus
preferable.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the political offense doctrine is a discretionary concept whose ap-
plicability depends upon the immediate political needs of the requested
country, then it must be determined what political needs should be taken
into account. When Congress first enacted our extradition law such deter-
minations were not relevant. It was believed that an even-handed, princi-
pled application of the doctrine by an organ of government suited for
such purposes was itself in the national interest.
Since that time, the administration of the political offense exception
has become more complicated. The use of terrorism to meet political
goals has pushed the concept to its limit. A principled application of the
doctrine, as it now stands, would require us to offer sanctuary to individ-
uals whose means we strongly disagree with. The advent of a world com-
munity whose members share a strong sense of interdependence has
brought into question the validity of the political offense doctrine itself.
In this setting, the propriety of judicial administration of the de-
fense, unquestioned for over 100 years, has been drawn sharply in dis-
pute. Recent cases in which the courts have withheld political offenders
from close U.S. allies have induced criticism of the courts' ability to ad-
minister the defense.
The political offense doctrine is not a unitary concept. It represents
the amalgamation of three or four different policies. More is at play than
immediate foreign policy concerns, although these concerns should surely
be considered. Over the years, the courts have made the doctrine into a
discretionary concept in recognition of the diversity of policy concerns
underlying the defense. Although the courts have shown a propensity to
ignore the defense where a serious foreign policy need is shown, absent
this need the courts have faithfully applied the defense, giving effect to
I" See supra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
2" Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 515.
209 See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 1980). (in camera re-
view used to review politically sensitive government evidence); see also Eain v. Wilkes, 641
F.2d at 515.
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the other objectives underlying the doctrine.
Having the executive exclusively determine the political offense ex-
ception would destroy this balance. Non-national interests would be ig-
nored in a purely executive administration of the defense. The executive
decision would be based on the expedience of the moment.
The authors propose that the courts are the appropriate forum for
the administration of the political offense exception. At the same time we
recognize that international events and practices might enable terrorists
to avoid extradition under the cloak of the political offense exception.
While the courts should retain jurisdiction over the political offense ex-
ception, the underlying legal test should be narrowed. The authors, thus,
submit that the Congress specifically exclude terrorist acts from the pro-
tection of the political offense exception.
Although there is no universally accepted definition of terrorism,2 10
Congress could draft a definition containing the following central ele-
ments. Terrorism would include individual or collective coercive violence
directed at a protected target, such as innocent civilians," diplomats or
civil aviation, whose aim is to change or preserve the structures or policies
of a given state or territory.212 This definition guarantees that mere politi-
21, B. CLINE, FORWARD To CONTROL OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL DocuMm~rs (Y. Alex-
ander, M. Browne & A. Nanes eds. 1979). The concept of terrorism is linguistically ambigu-
ous and therefore susceptible to political manipulation. Bonante, supra note 126, at 197-98.
First, the word "terrorism" tends to exclude state terrorism. Id. at 199. The usage of "ter-
rorism" has also been expanded to describe any revolutionary force that resorts to violence,
regardless of its targets and tactics.
311 For a discussion of the political and moral implications of legal distinctions regard-
ing innocence and the targets of political violence, see Paust, "Non-Protected" Persons or
Things, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL TmORISM 341, 343-345 (A. Evans & J. Mur-
phy eds. 1978).
211 This definition is adopted from that proposed by the 1973 Conference on Terrorism
and Political Crimes sponsored by the International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal
Sciences, at Siracusa, Italy:
Individual or collective coercive conduct employing strategies of terror vio-
lence which contain an international element or are directed against an interna-
tionally protected target and whose aim is to produce a power-oriented outcome.
Such conduct contains an international element when:
1) the perpetrator and victim are citizens of different states or
2) the conduct is performed in whole or in part in more than one state.
Internationally protected targets are:
1) innocent civilians;
2) duly accredited diplomats and personnel of international organizations
acting within the scope of their functions;
3) international civil aviation;
4) the mail and other means of international communications; and
5) members of nonbelligerent armed forces.
A power oriented outcome is: an outcome which is aimed at changing or preserv-
ing the political, social or economic structures or policies of a given state or terri-
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cal motivation will not prevent an act from being terrorist. Furthermore,
the definition distinguishes between terrorist acts directed against indis-
criminate targets and legitimate political violence directed against specific
political and military targets.213
If faithfully and universally applied, this test would deprive terrorists
of the protective cloak of the political offense exception. Under such legis-
lation, when an extraditee raises the political offense issue, the court
would scrutinize the act to determine whether it was terrorist. If the Eain
case were decided under this test, extradition would have automatically
resulted since the target of the offense was innocent civilians. In McMul-
len and Mackin, the targets were military targets intimately connected
with a protracted military conflict. They would not fall within the pro-
tected category and, therefore, the offenses would not be deemed terror-
ist.214 In such cases, the court would then apply the common law political
incidence test to determine whether the offense was political rather than
personal or common.
This proposal preserves the benefits of judicial characterization of
the offense while narrowing the exception to exclude terrorists. Courts
would continue to administer the defense on a case-by-case basis, weigh-
ing all the competing interests at stake. The actual nature of the offense
would remain the paramount consideration. The proposal would virtually
guarantee the extradition of terrorists without exposing legitimate politi-
cal offenders to persecution.
Judicial application of a terrorist test would narrow the political inci-
dence test and thereby eliminate most of the problems associated with
tory by means of coercive strategies.
Final Document, CONFERENCE ON TERRORIsm AND POLITICAL CRIaS, 30, SYRACUSE SICILY,
1973, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND PoLrncAL CRImS xiv (M.C. Bassiouni ed. 1975).
2'3 The Final Document of the 1973 Conference on Terrorism and Political Crimes con-
cluded that "(we) must... distinguish between legitimate rebellion and indiscriminate ter-
ror tactics. The resort to violence by individuals or groups engaging in wars of national
liberation is lawful when it remains within the confines of international law which recognizes
such activity. It is when acts of violence are committed indiscriminately, disproportionately
and contain an international element or are against internationally protected targets that
such acts become terrorism." Id. at xii.
214 Such a legal distinction, though perhaps callous, is consistent with the law of war.
The relevant aspects of the law of war may be briefly summarized by the following
propositions:
Belligerents shall not inflict harm on their adversaries out of proportion with
the object of warfare, which is to destroy or weaken the military strength of the
enemy.
Belligerents will leave non-combatants outside the area of operations and will
refrain from attacking them deliberately.
Attacks are legitimate when directed against military objectives, that is to say
whose total or partial destruction would constitute a definite military advantage.
E. BOND, THE RULES OF RIoT 76-77 (1974).
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the current administration of the defense. It would do so, however, with-
out impairing consideration of all the values underlying the political of-
fense exception and extradition in general.
